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Žižek and the Real Hegel
David J. Gunkel, Northern Illinois University (USA)

Žižek and Hegel, the terms and conditions of this relationship are, if anything,
complicated and contentious. On the one hand, Žižek—or more precisely Žižek's writings and
publications—attempt to affect "a return to Hegel" (Žižek 1989: 7). This return, it seems,
responds to and takes account of Michel Foucault's rather ominous warning: "We have to
determine the extent to which our anti-Hegelianism is possibly one of his tricks directed against
us, at the end of which he stands, motionless, waiting for us" (Foucault 1972: 235). According
to Foucault's characterization, the general movement of contemporary philosophy (in post-war
France in particular) may be characterized as an attempt to escape from Hegel and the
influence exerted by Hegelianism. This endeavor is, however, immediately complicated by the
possibility that such an escape may itself be something already comprehended and anticipated
by the Hegelian system. This is precisely the kind of argument Žižek mobilizes in Organs
without Bodies, where he endeavors to demonstrate that the anti-Hegelianism of Gilles
Deleuze, for all its concentrated and concerted efforts, remains thoroughly comprehended and
controlled by Hegelian dialectic: "Deleuze equals Hegel" (Žižek 2004: 49). It is also evident in
his encounters with other well-known poststructuralist readings of Hegel, like that proffered by
Jacques Derrida. "What the Derridean deconstruction brings out," Žižek (2008a) argues, "after
a great struggle and declares to be the inherent limit of dialectical mediation—the point at which
the movement of Aufhebung necessarily fails—Hegel posits directly as the crucial moment of
this movement" (85).1 For Žižek, this inescapable "Hegelian remainder" does not (as Foucault's
comment seems to imply) so much come back around to bite us on the ass as it always and
already is clinging to or hanging off the ass of the poststructuralist or anti-Hegelian project,
unable to be effectively eliminated to begin with. And in all of this the excremental language is
not simply a clever (albeit somewhat disgusting) metaphor. For Žižek, Hegel is quite literally
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something that cannot be easily eliminated despite efforts, claims, and pretensions to the
contrary.
On the other hand, Žižek is arguably a poor and less than celebrated champion of Hegel
and Hegelianism. His readings are, as he himself is well aware, admittedly unorthodox and
deliberately work against "a doxa which is today as commonplace on all sides of the
philosophical spectrum, from Adorno to 'post-structuralism'" (Žižek 2008a: 61). As Ian Parker
(2004) describes it, "Žižek's Hegel is quite different from the versions of Hegel that usually
circulate in Western philosophy" (38). And most of the orthodox "true believers," the avid
readers of the Owl of Minerva and the staunch defenders of the Hegelian legacy, would not
want to be seen in his company. Žižek's Hegel is not their Hegel, and they often resist and
criticize his bastardizations and the admittedly monstrous figure that they produce (Rasmussen
2004: unpaginated). As Peter Dews (1995) succinctly characterizes it, the basic problem is that
Žižek's "Lacanian reading of Hegel does not do justice to the complexity of Hegel's thought"
(247). Noah Horwitz (2005) takes this criticism one step further, arguing that Žižek's mash-up
of Hegelian philosophy and Lacanian psychoanalysis unfortunately gets both sides wrong:
"Such a 'return to Hegel' not only risks mis-reading Hegel as Lacan avant la lettre, but risks
reading Lacan as Hegel" (24). So it appears that Žižek is also the turd in the Hegelian punch
bowl—a terrible and potentially embarrassing excrescence that effectively spoils the party for
everyone involved.
The relationship between Žižek and Hegel is, therefore, anything but straight forward
and simple. And this complexity inevitable generates a number of intertwined and seemingly
irresolvable questions:



Can it be said that Žižek simply gets it wrong? Are his Lacanian influenced readings
of Hegel nothing more than truncated perversions and inappropriate deviations from
both the letter and spirit of the Hegelian text?



Or is it the case, to put it in Hegelian terminology, that Žižek turns out to be the truth
of Hegel, that his reactualization of Hegelian dialectics via Lacanian psychoanalysis
constitutes a sublation of the difference that has opened up between Hegel and the
poststructuralist deconstructive anti-Hegelianism of the late 20th century?



Or is it that Žižek, to borrow Heideggerian terminology, "retrieves" something from
Hegel, something covered over by the sediment of interpretation, translation, and
history that would be, as Žižek (1989: 205) says of Kant, more Hegelian than Hegel
himself?
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In trying to formulate responses to these questions, we often find ourselves, for better or worse,
in the somewhat uncomfortable position of needing to make reference to and relying on what
can only be called "the real Hegel." This is because, beginning with at least Platonic
philosophy, efforts to demonstrate either faithful adherence to something or inaccurate
deviation from it inevitably requires that one posit and/or have access to what is considered to
be the real, the true, and the original (Plato 1987). Take for example the evaluation provided in
T. M. Knox's review of Herbert Marcuse's Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social
Theory: "The Hegel of the many text-books," Knox (1942) writes, "is portrayed as preoccupied
with logical abstractions; but the real Hegel pursued these only in order to discover a
metaphysical framework for the solution of the concrete problems in politics, religion, etc.,
which were his primary interest" (265, emphasis added). In order to characterize, critique, and
eventually dismiss the inaccurate accounts of Hegelian philosophy that have been circulated in
the standard text-books, Knox makes reference to and invokes "the real Hegel." This "real
Hegel" is, it is argued, not only considerably different from what appears in these text-books but
provides a consistent and unquestioned standard against which it is possible to identify these
various representations as inaccurate or deceptive. A similar appeal to the "real Hegel" is
made by Terry Pinkard, one of Hegel's Anglophone biographers. "You can," Pinkard explains in
an interview from 2000, "sum up Hegel quickly, get the impression you understand him, and
also dismiss him just as quickly. Looking at the real Hegel is harder but more rewarding" (Postel
2000: unpaginated, emphasis added). Even Žižek is not immune to this kind of transaction,
which pits inappropriate apparitions against the "real thing." At a crucial juncture in Organs
without Bodies, for example, Žižek (2004) articulates three different and competing
interpretations of Hegel and then asks the obvious question: "So, which of these three positions
is the 'real' Hegel?" (57). It is the "real Hegel," then, that is the problem. We appear to need
access to this real thing in order to characterize, evaluate, and/or criticize Žižek's particular
reading and understanding of Hegel. Yet it is Žižek, "the philosopher of the Real" as Tony
Myers (2003: 29) characterizes him, who points out how the very concept of the real (and our
seemingly irrepressible desire for access to it) is itself a real philosophical problem.
Metaphysical Games
At the risk of making what is by now a well-known, perhaps even trite, Žižekian gesture,
I begin with a television game show. The program, To Tell the Truth, was created by Bob
Stewart, produced by the highly successful production team of Mark Goodson and Bill Todman
(arguably the Rodgers and Hammerstein of the television game show industry), and ran
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intermittently on several U.S. television networks since its premier in the mid-1950's. To Tell
the Truth was a panel show, which like its precursor, What's My Line (1950-1967)2 featured a
panel of four celebrities, mainly "television personalities" like Nipsey Russell, Betty White, Gene
Rayburn, and Kitty Carlisle. The panelists, who sat side-by-side behind a long desk, were
confronted with a group of three individuals, or what the program's host and referee called a
"team of challengers." Each member of this trio claimed to be a particular individual who had
some unusual background, notable life experience, or unique occupation. The celebrity panel
was charged with interrogating the three challengers and deciding, based on the responses to
their questions, which one of the three was actually the person s/he purported to be—who, in
effect, was telling the truth. In this exchange, two of the challengers engaged in deliberate
deception, answering the questions of the celebrity panel by pretending to be someone they
were not, while the remaining challenger told the truth. The "moment of truth" came at the
game's conclusion, when the program's host asked the pivotal question "Will the real so-and-so
please stand up?" at which time one of the three challengers stood. In doing so, this one
individual revealed him/herself as the real thing and exposed, by comparison, the other two to
be false representations and imposters.
Although ostensibly a simple form of entertainment designed, like most programs in
American broadcast television, to deliver an audience to product advertisers, To Tell the Truth
is based on and stages some of the fundamental concerns of Western metaphysics. First, the
program differentiates and distinguishes between the real thing and its phenomenal
appearances. According to the program's structure, the real thing is not only hidden by the
various apparitions that are presented to the panel but is situated just below, behind, or outside
(the spatial metaphors can be manipulated in a number of different ways) the surface of these
apparitions. Consequently, there is a real thing. It is, however, hidden or concealed by various
competing and somewhat unreliable appearances. Second, in the face of these different
apparitions, the panelists attempt to ascertain what is real by interrogating the appearances and
looking for significant inconsistencies, incongruities, and even betrayals within phenomenal
reality. The panelists, therefore, scrutinize the appearances in order to determine what is real
and what is not. Third, the effectiveness of this particular undertaking can be evaluated by
comparing each panelist's final judgment to the real thing. This means that the panelists will, at
some point in the program, have access to the real itself, as itself and not as a mere
appearance. At some point, then, namely at the end of the program, the real thing can be
made to stand up, to show itself as itself, so that the panelists may have direct and unmitigated
access to it. Finally, once the real thing is revealed, the four panelists (and the viewing
audience) will know which appearances were truthful and which were false. They will come to
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perceive, by a kind of retrospective comparison, who among the challengers had been telling
the truth and who was lying, who among the four panelists judged correctly and who did not
and, most importantly, what is real and what is merely an illusory deception and fiction.
This is, as any student of philosophy will immediately recognize, the basic configuration
attributed to Platonic metaphysics. For mainstream Platonism, the real is situated outside of
and beyond phenomenal reality. That is, the real things are located in the realm of
supersensible ideas and what is perceived by embodied and finite human beings are derivative
and deficient apparitions.3 This "doctrine of the forms," as it eventually comes to be called, is
evident, in various forms, throughout the Platonic corpus. It appears, for example, in the final
book of The Republic, where Socrates distinguishes between the unique idea of something and
its multifarious particular appearances: "'Shall we, then, start the inquiry at this point by our
customary procedure? We are in the habit, I take it, of positing a single idea or form in the
case of the various multiplicities to which we give the same name. Do you not understand?' 'I
do.' 'In the present case, then, let us take any multiplicity you please; for example, there are
many couches and tables.' 'Of course.' 'But these utensils imply, I suppose, only two ideas or
forms, one of a couch and one of a table'" (Plato 1987: 596a-b). According to the exchange
that follows, the real thing—the real couch in this particular case—is the unique idea that exists
outside of and beyond what would be called experiential reality, while the various things that we
do encounter in this world through the mediation of our senses are derived from and secondary
to this singular and eternal idea. There is, then, one eternal idea of the couch, of which
particular couches are only derived imitations and apparitions.
This distinction between the eternal and unchanging form of the real and its various
sensible apparitions, however, introduces an epistemological problem, namely, how and where
does one gain access to the real as such. Unlike To Tell the Truth, where the revelation of the
real takes place at the end of the game, Plato's Socrates situates access at the beginning, or
more precisely, prior to and outside of the space and time of lived experience. "For a human
being," Plato has Socrates say in the Phaedrus, "must understand a general idea formed by
collecting into a unity by means of reason the many perceptions of the senses; and this is a
recollection of those real things which our soul once beheld, when it journeyed with a god and,
lifting its vision above the things which we now say exist, rose up to real being" (Plato 1982:
249b-c). Platonic metaphysics, therefore, seems to invert the structure of To Tell the Truth,
situating the revelation of the real at the beginning and not the end of the program. In this way,
Platonism is actually more in-line with What's My Line, Goodson and Todman's initial panel
show and the immediate precursor to To Tell the Truth. In What's My Line, four celebrity
panelists interrogated one challenger in an attempt to ascertain this particular individual's
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occupation or line of work. Although the true identity of the challenger was concealed from the
celebrity panel, it was revealed to both the studio and television audience in advance of the
start of game play. In this way, the studio audience and television viewer were given privileged
access to the real, while the panel was restricted from knowing such information. This
epistemological difference created a kind of dramatic tension that was undeniably entertaining.
Like an omniscient being, the audience knew the truth of all things and watched the mere
mortal panel try to figure out the truth from their messy involvement in and limitation to
particular apparitions. Although Goodson and Todman were most likely unaware of the
influence, their game show was thoroughly informed by and functioned according to the
protocols of Platonism.
This Platonic structure, although well over 2400 years old, is also operative in
contemporary science, especially theoretical physics. For contemporary physicists, what we
perceive and call "real" does not, strictly speaking, have anything to do with what actually
comprises physical reality. As Brian Greene (2004) explains it, "physicists such as myself are
acutely aware that the reality we observe—matter evolving on the stage of space and time—
may have little to do with the reality, if any, that is out there" (ix). Greene, who is an advocate
of a brand of physics called "string theory," argues that physical reality is actually comprised of
vibrating filaments of energy called "strings." The strings, which are estimated to be "some
hundred billion billion times smaller than a single atomic nucleus" (Greene 2004: 345), cannot
be observed with any conceivable instrument or tested through any currently available form of
experiment. Instead their existence is calculated as the hypothetical resolution of a
fundamental conflict between the equations of general relativity and quantum mechanics. For
string theorists, then, the real of physical reality exists beyond the realm of human perception,
and what we call "reality" is only a derived effect and apparition. Like the Platonic forms, the
real of string theory is located outside the scope of direct experience and what is given to
perception is little more than an apparitional phenomenon that is, strictly speaking, illusory. "If
superstring theory is proven correct," Green (2004) concludes, "we will be forced to accept that
the reality we have known is but a delicate chiffon draped over a thick and richly textured
cosmic fabric" (19).
This point is emphasized by recently published critiques, which specifically target and
question the theory's provability. According to its critics, like Lee Smolen (2006) and Peter Woit
(2006), string theory, although mathematically elegant and undeniably popular in the academy,
lacks one of the basic requirements of science—an empirically verifiable experiment. String
theory, on this account, appears to be situated just outside the threshold of what is traditionally
considered to be the proper test of scientific truth. This does not mean, however, that string
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theorists advocate a new form of "groundless idealism," what one might be tempted to call
Platonism 2.0, and that string theory has somehow abandoned the scientific method or is
involved in perpetrating another Sokal hoax.4 Quite the contrary. "Nothing would," Greene
(2003) declares, "please string theorist more than to proudly present the world with a list of
detailed, experimentally testable predictions. Certainly, there is no way to establish that any
theory describes our world without subjecting its predictions to experimental verification" (210).
String theorist, then, do not reject experimental validation, they simply postpone its
achievement. That is, the empirically verifiable data necessary to prove string theory's
predictions, although currently inaccessible to us, will at some point in the not-too-distant future
be made available as such. In support of this claim, advocates often point out that new insights
in physics have often preceded experimental demonstration by a good number of years. "The
history of physics is," Greene (2003) argues, "filled with ideas that when first presented seemed
completely untestable but, through various unforeseen developments, were ultimately brought
within the realm of experimental verifiability" (226). Whereas Platonism, like the game show
What's my Line, situates access to the real in a prior revelation that takes place outside the
space and time of terrestrial experience, theoretical physics, like the game show To Tell the
Truth, locates its revelation within the material of empirical reality at a point in the not-toodistant future.
Critical Revisions and Perverse Remakes
Immanuel Kant, who Žižek (2001a: 160 and 2004: 45) considers to be the critical pivot
in the history of Western thought, radicalizes the problem, wresting it away from naïve forms of
both idealism and empiricism. Kant, following the Platonic precedent, differentiates between
the object as it appears to us (finite and embodied human beings) through the mediation of our
senses and the thing as it really is in-itself. "What we have meant to say," Kant (1965) writes in
the opening salvo of the Critique of Pure Reason, "is that all our intuition is nothing but the
representation of appearance; that the things which we intuit are not in themselves what we
intuit them as being, nor their relations so constituted in themselves as they appear to us" (A
42/B 59). This differentiation installs a fundamental and irreconcilable split whereby "the object
is to be taken in a two fold sense, namely as appearance and as thing in itself" (Kant 1965: B
xxvii). Human beings are restricted to the former, while the latter remains, for us at least,
forever unapproachable. "What objects may be in themselves, and apart from all this
receptivity of our sensibility, remains completely unknown to us. We know nothing but our
mode of perceiving them—a mode, which is peculiar to us, and not necessarily shared in by
every being, though, certainly by every human being" (Kant 1965: A 42/B 59). Despite the
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complete and absolute inaccessibility of the thing itself, Kant still "believes" in its existence.5
"But our further contention must also be duly borne in mind, namely that though we cannot
know these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to think them
as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can
be appearances without anything that appears" (Kant 1965: B xxvi).6 Consequently, Kant
redeploys the Platonic distinction between the real thing and its appearances, adding the further
qualification that access to the real thing is, if we are absolutely careful in defining the proper
use and limits of our reason, forever restricted and beyond us.
It follows from this that if Kant's critical philosophy had been employed in the design of
To Tell the Truth, the game show would have been pretty much the same with one crucial
difference.7 There would, of course, be the celebrity panel who would seek to know the truth
through interrogation and the three challengers who would present this panel with various and
competing appearances. At the moment of truth, however, the final gesture would be
truncated. When the host asks the question "will the real so-and-so please stand up?" no one
would respond; none of the challenges would stand and be recognized as the real thing.
Instead, the panel and the audience would be confronted with fact that finite human beings are
unable to know the thing as it truly is in itself. This does not mean, however, that there is no
real thing. He/she/it would in fact exist, and Kant would be the first to insist upon it. He would,
however, be just as strict in insisting that this real thing, whatever it really is, cannot be made to
appear before us in phenomenal reality under the revealing lights of the television studio. It,
whatever it is, remains forever off screen, perhaps just outside the frame of televisual
phenomena, behind the curtain of the studio set, or held in the green room just down the hall.
The Kantian version of the game, therefore, would probably end with a distinctly Kantian
admonishment. Something like, "Remember folks, what you see here is all you get. Going
further would be a violation of the proper use of our reason. Good night and see you next
week." Although perfectly consistent with the stipulations of the Critique of Pure Reason, such
a program would not last very long, mainly because we would not get the final revelation and
pay-off. We would, in effect, be forever denied and barred from the "the money shot."
This outcome is something that Hegel, in particular, would find unsatisfactory, but not for
the obvious reason. What Hegel would object to is not the lack of resolution, that is, Kant's
seemingly stubborn insistence on the fundamental limitations of human knowledge and its
absolute inability to achieve access to the thing-in-itself. Instead Hegel criticizes Kant for
pulling punches, for not taking his own innovations far enough. "It is Kant," Žižek (2006) writes,
"who goes only halfway in his destruction of metaphysics, still maintaining the reference to the
Thing-in-itself as the externally inaccessible entity; Hegel is merely a radicalized Kant, who
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takes the step from negative access to the Absolute to the Absolute itself as negativity" (27).
According to Žižek's reading, what Hegel finds unsatisfactory is the fact that the Kantian
revolution in metaphysics remains, despite and in the face of Kant's own explicit claims,
incomplete and unfulfilled. He only goes halfway, providing us with half a metaphysical
revolution. For Kant, the thing-in-itself, although forever inaccessible to finite human beings, is
still thought of as a positive, substantive thing. "Kant still presupposes that the Thing-in-itself
exists as something positively given beyond the field of representation" (Žižek 1989: 205).
Hegel finds this both incomplete and inconsistent. He therefore takes up and pushes the
Kantian insight further.
The Thing-in-itself expresses the object when we leave out of sight all that
consciousness makes of it, all its determinate feelings and thoughts. It is easy to
see what is left—utter abstraction, total emptiness, only described still as a
beyond—the negative of every representation, feeling, and determination. Nor
does it require much reflection to see that this caput mortuum is still only a
product of thought...that it is the work of the empty I, which makes an object out
of this empty self-identity of its own...Hence one can only read with wonder the
perpetual remark that we do not know the Thing-in-itself. On the contrary there
is nothing we can know so easily (Hegel 1987: 72).
Hegel, therefore, criticizes Kant not for insisting on the necessarily limited capacity of human
knowledge or the fundamental inaccessibility of the thing-in-itself, but for wrongly presupposing
that the thing-in-itself is some positive, substantive thing and missing the fact that this thing is
itself "nothing but the inherent limitation of the intuited phenomena" (Žižek 1993: 39). "Where
Kant thinks that he is still dealing only with a negative presentation of the Thing, we are already
in the midst of the Thing-in-itself—for this Thing-in-itself is nothing but this radical negativity. In
other words—in a somewhat overused Hegelian speculative twist—the negative experience of
the Thing must change into the experience of the Thing-in-itself as radical negativity" (Žižek
1989: 205-206).
This Hegelian-influenced elaboration results in a much more complicated concept of the
real, and Žižek finds Jacques Lacan to be the one thinker who gives it adequate articulation.
On Žižek's reading, the Lacanian real is anything but simple, and, beginning with Žižek's
earliest works, is characterizes as consisting of two, seemingly incompatible aspects. In The
Sublime Object of Ideology, Žižek's first book in English, the Real (which Žižek almost always
distinguishes with a capital letter) is described as "simultaneously both the hard, impenetrable
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kernel resisting symbolization and a pure chimerical entity which has in itself no ontological
consistency" (1989: 169). A similar explanation is provided in Tarrying with the Negative, which
appeared four years later: "A certain fundamental ambiguity pertains to the notion of the Real in
Lacan: the Real designates a substantial hard kernel that precedes and resists symbolization
and, simultaneously, it designates the left-over, which is posited or produced by symbolization
itself" (Žižek 1993: 36). Žižek's ontology of the Real, therefore, appears, as Adrian Johnston
(2008) characterizes it, to oscillate between "the (Kantian) Real-as-presupposed (présupposé)
and the (Hegelian) Real-as-posed (posé)" (146).8 "Oscillation," is an appropriate term in this
context insofar as it connotes a continual shifting back and forth. For Žižek, then, it is not a
matter of sequential progress, moving, for instance, from the Kantian perspective to the
Hegelian. Nor is it a matter of choosing sides, deciding, for example, to back one team in
opposition to the other. Nor is this all a result of sloppy or inaccurate thinking on Žižek's part—
what one might be tempted to identify as an inability to decide one way or the other. Instead it
is a matter of perspective, the ability to see both sides simultaneously. "The Real," Žižek
(2003) argues, "is simultaneously the Thing to which direct access is not possible and the
obstacle that prevents this direct access; the Thing that eludes our grasp and the distorting
screen that makes us miss the Thing. More precisely, the Real is ultimately the very shift of
perspective from the first standpoint to the second" (77). From one angle the Real is perceived
as the Thing to which direct access is not possible—a kind of Kantian thing-in-itself. "On a
second approach, however, we should merely take note of how this radical antinomy that
seems to preclude our access to the Thing is already the Thing itself" (Žižek 2003: 77).
For Žižek, then, the Real is parallactic. "It has no substantial density in itself, it is just a
gap between two points of perspective, perceptible only in the shift from the one to the other"
(Žižek 2006: 26). This alternative account of the Real, as Žižek points out on more than one
occasion, bears a certain resemblance (without necessarily being the same) to a more
sophisticated understanding of theoretical physics. Although Žižek (1996) pursues an
interesting game of connect the dots with quantum mechanics, it is string theory that provides
what is perhaps the best demonstration. As pointed out previously, string theory lacks any kind
of experiment that would prove its insights and this lack has, as one might expect, fueled the
efforts expended by the theory's adherents and critics alike. The Real of string theory—the
imperceptible strings of energy that supposedly vibrate in nine or more dimensions—are not
directly accessible with any currently available or foreseeable process, technology, or
experimental apparatus. Like Žižek's account of the Lacanian Real, these strings are posited
as the "hard kernel" that subtends and precedes the statements of theory. At the same time,
however, these strings do not have any substantial density, cannot be directly observed with any
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conceivable instrument, and cannot be tested through any currently available form of experiment.

They are, at least as things currently stand, nothing more than a lack or gap that appears within
the texture of the theory itself. This does not mean, however, that anything goes—that anything
and everything can be legitimately situated under the banner of "string theory." String theorists
neither tolerate this kind of epistemological relativism nor endorse, as Žižek (2003)
characterizes it, the "'postmodern' notion that appearance is more valuable than stupid reality:
that, ultimately, there is no final Reality, just the interplay between multiple appearances" (78).
Žižek's position on this is as strict as any physical scientist: "Everything is not just the interplay
of appearance, there is a Real—this Real , however, is not the inaccessible Thing, but the gap
that prevents our access to it" (78).
This changes not so much the structure but the outcome of the metaphysical game. In
what would be a Žižekian remake of To Tell the Truth, things would begin and proceed with little
or no significant alteration. A celebrity panel would confront and interrogate three challengers,
all of whom would make competing claims to be the real thing. The truth of the matter would,
as in the Goodson/Todman production, be withheld. And because of this, the panel can only
attempt to gain access to the real through an engagement with the manifold and often
conflicting representations provided by the three challengers. The real difference becomes
evident at the game's end, when the real thing is asked to stand and reveal itself as such.
Here, as in the Kantian version, we do not get the naïve gratification of the real making a final
and revealing appearance in phenomenal reality. As with the Kantian conclusion, no one
stands up. The difference—the "minimal difference," as Žižek often calls it—comes
immediately after or alongside this apparent failure or lack of resolution. The Žižekian game,
unlike the Kantian version, would not conclude with a rather unsatisfactory and somewhat
disappointing admonishment. In order for the game's ending to be construed in this way, we
would need, like Kant to presuppose and place value in the positive existence of the thing itself.
We would still need to "believe" in the thing-in-itself. Žižek's version, however, would insists on
"tarrying with the negative," with the fact that this apparent lack of resolution is itself a
resolution. Or to put it another way, at the end of the program, when no one stands up, there is
no final and absolute revelation of the thing itself. This lack of revelation, however, is itself
revealing. Through it, we come to see that the so-called real thing, which had been
presupposed from the very beginning of the program and that had directed its very movement,
is a kind of posed or posited fiction. "This unique procedure," Žižek (2008a) writes in a
passage that appears to address itself to the operations of the game show, "is the opposite of
the standard revelation of the illusory status of (what we previously misperceived as) part of
reality: what is thereby asserted is rather, in a paradoxical tautological move, the illusory status
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of the illusion itself—the illusion that there is some suprasensible noumenal Entity is shown
precisely to be an 'illusion', a fleeting apparition" (xxxv). Consequently, what is revealed in the
Žižekian version of the game is not a real thing standing above, behind, or outside of the play of
appearances and comprehending everything. What is revealed is that this very expectation—
an expectation that has been inherited from Plato and that has, since that time, held an
important and controlling interest in Western intellectual history—is itself a metaphysical fantasy
and fabrication.
Will the Real Hegel Please Stand Up?
Žižek's insights, although clearly influenced by Kant, Lacan, and others, are often
referred to the philosophical innovations introduced by Hegel. When push comes to shove, it is
Hegel who occupies the privileged position: "Ultimately if I am," Žižek admits in an interview
from 2004, "to choose just one thinker, it's Hegel. He's the one for me" (Ramussen 2004:
unpaginated). The question that remains, then, is how accurate and attentive are Žižek's
readings of Hegel? How faithful are his interpretations, representations, and characterizations
in comparison to the thing we call and would recognize as being Hegel? Are what Žižek says
and writes about Hegel and Hegelianism valid, truthful, and credible? Or do they show
evidence of imprecise representations, deficient mischaracterizations, or perhaps even
deliberate perversions? In order to answer these questions, we appear to need access to
Hegel—not just this or that particular representation of Hegel but the real thing. In the parlance
of the game show, we seem to need the real Hegel to stand up so that he can be recognized as
such and we can, by comparison, evaluate Žižek's representations to be accurate, flawed, or
deceptive. In fact, we are in no position either to credit Žižek for getting it right or to criticize
him for screwing it up without some form of appeal to this real thing that would anchor,
substantiate, and authorize such a judgment. This all seems to be rather simple and straight
forward. It is, however, anything but simple. Everything depends on how one understands and
characterizes "the real."
The typical understanding and approach provides what appears to be immediate and
satisfactory answers to these kinds of questions. In order to appraise Žižek's representations
of Hegel (or those of any other philosopher, for that matter), it is assumed that one would have
unmitigated access to the real in itself, outside of and apart from the representations that are to
be evaluated. Such access has been customarily situated in either in some fantastic past
encounter or future revelation. The former, which comprises the party-line of mainstream
Platonism and is exemplified in What's My Line, is evident in those approaches to reading and
literary criticism that are informed by and patronize communication theory. According to this
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formulation, there was a real Hegel to whom one could have had access at some point. That
time, however, is now past. The real Hegel, the person and the author, is dead and gone. As a
result of this, we are now limited to dealing with the manifold and multifarious appearances of
Hegel that occur within phenomenal reality. This is comprised not only of the Phenomenology
of Spirit but of all of the texts, notes, letters, and course transcripts that bear the authorizing
signature of Hegel. Also included would be the numerous translations of this oeuvre, critical
evaluations and interpretations by noted scholars like T. M. Knox or Alexandre Kojève, and, of
course, the reactualization that is Žižek's particular contribution. In the face of these different
and often times competing versions/visions of Hegel, the reader is in the position of having to
recollect what Hegel actually thought or really wanted to say from an engagement with what
appears before him/her. And in the various debates and discussions that arise, one often finds
oneself leveraging and making reference to this real Hegel, who would, it is assumed, be the
final word, ultimate authority, and conclusive arbiter of any disagreement. As Roland Barthes
(1967: unpaginated) characterized it, "the Author, when we believe in him, is always conceived
as the past of his own book: the book and the author take their places of their own accord on
the same line, cast as a before and an after: the Author is supposed to feed the book — that is,
he pre-exists it, thinks, suffers, lives for it; he maintains with his work the same relation of
antecedence a father maintains with his child." This paternal metaphor has a long and
venerable history within Western philosophy and is rooted in what is arguably the first
articulation of a theory of reading and writing—Plato's Phaedrus. According to an exchange
that occurs towards this dialogue's end, the written word is a kind of abandoned and wayward
child who always needs the authority of its father to legitimize what it says (Plato 1982: 275d-e).
The flipside of this arrangement is that kind of exacting realism often attributed to the
"hard sciences" and exemplified in a game show like To Tell the Truth. In this case, access to
the real is not something that recedes into an irrecoverable past but is projected into a future
that is yet to come. Although string theory currently lacks a suitable experiment that would
confirm its insights with empirically verifiable information, many physicists anticipate that such
an experiment will, at some time in the not-too-distant future, be available and will yield the
appropriate empirical data. At some point in the future, then, the real thing will, in the idiom of
the game show, be made to stand and reveal itself as itself. Consequently the real Hegel,
although not currently available, will at some future moment be made to stand up and be
identified as such. This could occur, for instance, with the discovery a text, a letter, or a lecture
transcript that had not been widely available or read, like the recent interest in Hegel's
(fortuitously titled) Realphilosophie of 1805/06; a new translation of one of the canonical works
that not only transforms Hegel's 19th century German into something more readable but in doing
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so illuminates some previously inaccessible corner of his thought; or an insightful commentary
or interpretation that brings Hegelian philosophy into contact with contemporary issues and that
reveals aspects of Hegelianism that have until this time gone largely unnoticed or
underappreciated. No matter how or where it takes place, this revelation of the real is not
something that had occurred and is now past; it is something that is anticipated and still to
come.
This approach is particularly evident in that brand of philosophy that would be, as Kant
(1965) had described it, "raised to the dignity of a science" (B xxxvi). In these cases, the real
authority is not situated in the individual (more-often-than-not dead) philosopher who wrote this
or that particular treatise but is situated elsewhere. "This shift," as Žižek (2008b) describes it,
"is the shift from 'I speak the truth' to 'the truth itself speaks (in/through me),' to the point at
which I can say, like Meister Eckhart, 'it is true, and the truth says it itself'" (2). Already with
Plato, responsibility for what Socrates says and does is referred elsewhere and placed in the
service of another authorizing agent (Plato 1990: 23b-c). As Nietzsche (1974) characterized
this rather distinctive rhetorical gesture, "It wasn't I! Not I! But a god through me" (191).
Similarly the real authority in the physical sciences rests not in the particular expressions and
opinions of this or that individual physicist, but with, for lack of a better description, Nature
herself. And the real authority in philosophy is, according to Hegel's own explanations, situated
likewise. The real truth of Hegelianism, therefore, rests not in G. W. F. Hegel's personal
opinions, thoughts, or intentions. It is instead a matter of the Concept's self-development and
its own self-expression to which the philosopher Hegel contributes. This means, of course, that
Hegel, the individual person and philosopher, is not necessarily the final and complete authority
on Hegelianism, which is an insight that is explicitly mobilized and further developed by 20th
century literary criticism in the wake of what Rolland Barthes (1967) called "the death of the
author." In the Hegelian text, recognition of this particular situation is, as one would expect
from a thinker (or thinking) so dedicated to self-conscious reflectivity, explicitly documented and
identified as such: "The share in the total work of Spirit which falls to the individual can only be
very small. Because of this, the individual must all the more forget himself, as the nature of
Science implies and requires. Of course, he must make of himself and achieve what he can;
but less must be demanded of him, just as he in turn can expect less of himself, and may
demand less for himself" (Hegel 1977: 45).
Although seemingly opposed, these two approaches share at least one fundamental
assumption, namely, that the real thing (whether that consist in the thoughts of an individual
philosopher or the philosophical truth of the matter) can, at some point (no matter how
impossible that might seem at this current point in time), be revealed. What both agree upon,
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therefore, is a dedication to the real and the desire to have the real stand up and be recognized
as such. Kant, of course, complicates things by demonstrating how access to this real thing-initself is forever restricted and inaccessible. There is, on his account, no privileged past or
future revelation (or, what for Kant, at least, amounts to the same, no suitable way of knowing
one way or the other) where the real thing would be given to us directly. When considered in
this fashion, all we can ever have access to are the various appearances that occur in
phenomenal reality and the real thing, whatever that might be, is something that remains
forever, at least for us, restricted, withdrawn, and unknown. When the ultimate question is
asked—Will the real Hegel please stand up?—we get nothing; there is no final, definitive, or
authoritative revelation. "We know," Barthes (1967: unpaginated) writes in a passage that
appears to be indebted to this Kantian insight, "that a text does not consist of a line of words,
releasing a single 'theological' meaning (the 'message' of the Author-God), but is a space of
many dimensions, in which are wedded and contested various kinds of writing, no one of which
is original."
This approach although seemingly more sophisticated and attentive to the facts on the
ground (we can, it seems, no more go back in time to meet the real G. W. F. Hegel9 nor is there
much hope that some final and definitive revelation will be made about the truth of Hegelianism
in the future) has the potential to devolve into two kinds of abuses—abuses that Žižek identifies
with the terms "democracy" and "totalitarianism." "Both liberal-political democracy and
'totalitarianism.'" Žižek (2002) writes, "foreclose a politics of truth. Democracy, of course, is the
reign of sophists: there are only opinions; any reference by a political agent to some ultimate
truth is denounced as 'totalitarian.' What 'totalitarianism' regimes impose, however, is also a
mere semblance of truth: an arbitrary Teaching whose function is simply to legitimize the
pragmatic decisions of the Rulers" (176). Since we are, as Kant insists, restricted to the
manifold of appearances and forever barred from accessing the thing-in-itself, there is, strictly
speaking, no suitable access to a final and ultimate authority situated outside of and beyond
this particular engagement with the phenomena. Consequently, any version of reality appears
to be just as valid as any other. And when it comes to reading the work of a particular
philosopher, like Hegel, any interpretation would, it seems, be just as good as any other. "Thus
literature," Barthes (1967: unpagniated) argues, "by refusing to assign to the text (and to the
world as text) a 'secret:' that is, an ultimate meaning, liberates an activity which we might call
counter-theological, properly revolutionary, for to refuse to arrest meaning is finally to refuse
God and his hypostases, reason, science, the law." Since there is no final and absolute
authority on the matter, anyone and everyone it seems would be entitled to their opinion. And
when these various opinions come into conflict with each other, the resolution would be the
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rather unsatisfactory platitude that is all-too-often the outcome of this kind of relativism—"we'll
just have to agree to disagree."
Conversely the same critical insights also have the potential to lead, in what appears to
be the absolute opposite direction, to forms of intolerant totalitarianism. If access to the real
thing is forever lacking, then authority is ultimately a transient matter and is available to
whoever stakes a claim to it and is able to defend this claim against the competition.10 This
approach is often mobilized in religion, especially fundamentalist traditions. Since God is that
entity who cannot appear before us or show himself as himself, one man or a group of men
(and it has been almost always a matter of men) claim to speak for and on behalf of the divine.
And when one claim inevitably butts up against and comes into conflict with another, resolution
is all too often a matter of violent confrontation. This politicization of truth, however, is not
limited to religious conflicts. It is also a rather common practice in the academy. Because the
real Hegel is withdrawn from the scene, some noted expert, like T. M. Knox (1942) for instance,
proclaims that it is Herbert Marcuse who "gives us the real Hegel" (265). This claim's legitimacy
is not based on some unique and privileged access to the real but is ultimately an arbitrary and
capricious decision. And when this particular claim runs up against other, just as legitimate
claims, resolution is a matter of force—not necessarily physical confrontation but forceful
argumentation and persuasive debate. In this way, then, "moral majority fundamentalists and
tolerant multiculturalists are," as Žižek (2001) points out, "two sides of the same coin" (68).
Žižek's own innovations contest these outcomes. He clearly opposes the rather naïve
solutions provided by those traditional approaches that presume some kind of fantastic access
to the thing-in-itself. At the same time, however, he is also not entirely satisfied with the
Kantian outcome and its insistence on an inaccessible yet extant thing. He therefore proposes
an alternative, and this alternative avoids both the Scylla of fundamentalist adherence to a
privileged thing that is presumably stripped bare of the distorting sediment of intellectual history
and the Charibdis of epistemological relativism—a kind of anything goes attitude that tolerates
different and competing interpretations as "all things being equal." "This means," Žižek (2003)
writes, "neither an epistemologically 'naïve' reliance on 'objective knowledge' available when we
get rid of our partial prejudices and preconception, and adopt a 'neutral' view, nor the
(complementary) relativist view that there is no ultimate truth, only multiple subjective
perspectives" (78). Žižek charts a different course. This alternative is not a kind of "middle
ground," which is explicitly rejected as a "worst case" scenario (Žižek 2003: 156). Rather it may
be characterized, as Žižek often asserts, as consisting in two complementary maneuvers. In a
first move, "the Real is the impossible hard core which we cannot confront directly, but only
through the lenses of a multitude of symbolic fictions, virtual formations. In a second move this
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very hard core is purely virtual, actually nonexistent, an X that can be reconstructed only
retroactively, from the multitude of symbolic formations which are 'all there actually is'" (Žižek
2006: 26).
Consequently, the real Hegel is, in the first place, that thing—the presumed hard kernel
—that exists outside of and beyond the seemingly endless circulation of representations that
appear in texts, interpretations, translations, and readings of Hegelian philosophy. At the same
time, this apparently substantial and independent hard kernel, if we are strict in our
understanding of human finitude and its proper epistemological restrictions, turns out to be
entirely virtual. It does not actually exist as such; it is instead a byproduct or virtual projection of
our entanglement with these different textual formations and appearances. The real Hegel,
then, is a retroactively reconstructed virtuality that is fashioned from out of what was thought to
be derivative and subsequent symbolic formations. Consequently, when the decisive question
—"Will the real Hegel please stand up?"—is asked, what we get is not necessarily what was
expected. What comes to be revealed is neither the thing-in-itself available to us in some
unmitigated immediacy nor the disappointment of its inability to make an appearance. What is
revealed is the lack of this kind of revelation and the way such expectations and assumptions
are always and already misguided and fantastic. And it is on this point that Žižek once again
comes into close proximity to Foucault: "It is not enough," Foucault (1984) writes, "to repeat the
empty affirmation that the author has disappeared. For the same reason, it is not enough to
keep repeating (after Nietzsche) that God and man have died a common death. Instead, we
must locate the space left empty by the author's disappearance, follow the distribution of gaps
and breaches, and watch for the openings that this disappearance uncovers" (105).
Truth or Consequences
This has, at least, three related consequences. First, what Žižek describes appears to
have a circular configuration: The real Hegel is the impossible "thing" which subtends,
proceeds, and exists outside what comes to appear in the various texts that bear his signature.
At the same time, this "thing" is purely virtual and only able to be reconstructed retroactively
from the multitude of this diverse textual material. This is not, despite initial appearances, some
kind of deficient "circular reasoning." It is, as Hegel himself points out, the proper configuration
of any "speculative" mode of cognition. For Hegel, "speculative" is not, as is often the case in
colloquial discourse, a pejorative term meaning groundless consideration or idle review of
something that is often inconclusive and indeterminate. It is not, therefore, to be construed as
a kind of pointless exercise in navel gazing. Instead, Hegel understands and utilizes the word
"speculative" in its strict etymological sense, which is derived from the Latin noun speculum.
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"Speculative," therefore, designates a form of self-reflective knowing. It is a manner of
cognition that makes its own cognizing an object of its consideration. The crucial task in the
face of this kind of speculative circularity is not to break out of the circle and to substantiate
what Briankle Chang (1996) calls the "naïve empiricist picture" (x) but to recognize the systemic
necessity of the circularity and to learn to enter into it and to work through it in a way that is
attentive to its structure and configuration. For Žižek, this means explicitly recognizing the way
what comes to be enunciated is always and already conditioned by the situation or place of
enunciation. "At the level of positive knowledge," Žižek (2008b) writes, "it is, of course, never
possible to (be sure that we have) attain(ed) the truth—one can only endlessly approach it,
because language is ultimately self-referential, there is no way to draw a definitive line of
separation between sophism, sophistic exercises, and Truth itself (this is Plato's problem).
Lacan's wager is here the Pascalean one: the wager of Truth. But how? Not by running after
'objective' truth, but by holding onto the truth about the position from which one speaks" (3).
The strategic advantage of a speculative mode of knowing is not that it provides one with
privileged and immediate access to the object in its raw or naked state but that it continually
conceptualizes the place from which one claims to know anything and submits to investigation
the position from which one makes any claim whatsoever.
Second, this speculative structure, as Žižek points out, necessarily entails a transformed
understanding of truth and affects the attempt to tell the truth. "There are," as Martin Heidegger
(1962) described it, "three theses which characterize the way in which the essence of truth has been
traditionally taken and the way it is supposed to have been first defined: (1) that the 'locus' of truth is
the statement (judgment); (2) that the essence of truth lies in the 'agreement' of the judgment with its
object; (3) that Aristotle, the father of logic, not only has assigned truth to the judgment as its
primordial locus but has set going the definition of 'truth' as 'agreement'" (257). According to this
characterization, truth is not something that resides in objects but is located in statements about
objects. In other words, truth is not "out there" to be discovered in things but is essentially a relative
concept. It subsists in the agreement or correspondence between a statement about something,
what is commonly called a "judgment," and the object about which the statement is made.
Heidegger (1962) illustrates this characterization with a simple example: "Let us suppose that

someone with his back turned to the wall makes the true statement that 'the picture on the wall
is hanging askew.' This statement demonstrates itself when the man who makes it, turns
around and perceives the picture hanging askew on the wall" (260). The truth of the statement,
"the picture is hanging askew," is evaluated by "turning around" and comparing the content of
the statement to the state of the actual object. If the statement agrees with or corresponds to
the object, then it is true; if not, it is false. According to Heidegger's analysis (1962), this
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particular understanding of truth—truth as agreement or correspondence—dominates "the
history of Western humanity" (184) and can therefore be found throughout the Western
philosophical and scientific traditions.11 Žižek's understanding of the real complicates this
formulation. Since the real cannot ever be presented to us as such, truth cannot be evaluated
by comparing a statement made about some thing to the real thing. Truth, therefore, can
longer be conceptualized and evaluated as simple, linear correspondence.
The 'truth,' is not the 'real' state of things, that is, the 'direct' view of the object
without perspectival distortion, but the very Real of the antagonism that causes
perspectival distortion. The site of truth is not the way 'things really are in
themselves,' beyond their perspectival distortions, but the very gap, passage,
that separates one perspective from another, the gap that makes the two
perspectives radically incommensurable….There is a truth; everything is not
relative—but this truth is the truth of the perspectival distortion as such, not the
truth distorted by the partial view of a one-sided perspective (Žižek 2003: 79 and
Žižek 2006: 281).
For Žižek, then, truth no longer resides in and can be evaluated by measuring the
correspondence of a statement about something to the real thing itself. This kind of basic oneto-one correspondence, which is the standard operating presumption of both To Tell the Truth
and What's My Line, has been and remains a mere metaphysical game. To put it in
Heideggerian language, no matter how many times one turns around, s/he does not ever get
direct and unmitigated access to the real thing as it is in itself. Like the experiences of the
subterranean prisoner who is described in Plato's "Allegory of the Cave" (Plato 1987: 514a517a), the encounter with reality never achieves direct and immediate access to the thing itself
but is limited to what appears to be an endless succession of different and competing
representations, a kind of on-going and recursive mediation. Or as Žižek describes it, "the Real
is the appearance as appearance; it not only appears within appearances, it also is nothing but
its own appearance—it is simply a certain grimace of reality, a certain imperceptible,
unfathomable, ultimately illusory feature that accounts for the absolute difference within identity.
This Real is not the inaccessible beyond of phenomena, simply their doubling, the gap between
two inconsistent phenomena, a perspective shift" (Žižek 2008a: p. xxvii; see also Žižek 2001a:
80). Consequently, what we encounter in phenomenal reality is not derived from some
independent and pre-existing real thing but the order of precedence should be reversed. "The
multiple perspectival inconsistencies between phenomena are not an effect of the impact of the
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transcendental Thing—on the contrary, the Thing is nothing but the ontologization of the
inconsistency between phenomena" (Žižek 2008a: xxix-xxx). For this reason, if we could ever
peek behind the scenes or turn around fast enough to catch a glimpse of the real, what we
would encounter is not the real thing with its pants down. We would discover, as Žižek (2008a)
writes with reference to a passage from the Phenomenology of Spirit, "only what we put there"
(liv).
Finally, if all this is true (to use a colloquialism that is now somewhat more complicated
than initially appears), how is one to decide whether a particular reading of Hegel (or any other
philosopher, for that matter) is appropriate or not? Does this suggest that anything goes and,
as Dostoevsky's Ivan Karamazov puts it, "all things are permitted?" Does it mean, in the final
analysis, that Žižek's reading of Hegel is just as good as any other and that a decision one way
or the other is ultimately capricious, tentative, and inconclusive? If what we want in response to
these kinds of questions is evidence of truthful correspondence, that is, the demonstration of an
accurate reproduction and exacting fidelity to the real thing, we clearly will not get it. Žižek's
texts not only question and undermine this procedure, but he also deliberately violates its
assumptions and stipulations in practice. In fact, he advocates and engages in what he calls, in
reference to Deleuze's reading of the history of philosophy, "productive misreading" (Žižek
2004: ix). From the perspective of traditional ways of understanding the task of reading and the
truth of interpretation, such "misreading" can only appear to be transgressive, monstrous, and
deficient. It fails to achieve adequate correspondence and gets most, if not everything, wrong.
From another perspective, however, the situation can be interpreted otherwise. In this case,
"misreading" should not be construed as inadequate reproduction or inaccurate interpretation
but constitutes an informed betrayal and calculated intervention. "One can," as Žižek (2004)
argues, "only remain faithful to an author by way of betraying him (the actual letter of his
thought)" (13). This betrayal, however, is not mere infidelity with regards to some original thing.
"Infidelity" is not adequate insofar as it remains the mere negative and inverse of "fidelity"—a
word that has metaphysical, technical, and even conjugal connotations. Instead this "betrayal,"
in a way that is similar to Donna Haraway's (1991: 149) deployment of the concept of
"blasphemy," is generated through a kind of excessive and unrestrained faithfulness. "One
can," Žižek (2004) continues, "only truly betray an author by way of repeating him, by way of
remaining faithful to the core of his thought" (13). "Productive misreading," then, is not simply a
mistake, an error, or a kind of infidelity.12 It is a deliberately blasphemous form of excessive
faithfulness that follows an author's text carefully and literally, even to the point, as Derrida
(1978) says of Georges Bataille, "of agreeing with him against himself" (260).
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This does not mean, however, that anything goes and everything is permitted. Žižek is
as allergic to postmodern relativisms as he is to pre-modern dogmatism.13 The question before
us, therefore, is not whether and to what extent Žižek's readings of Hegel are accurate
reproductions of what Hegel actually thought and wrote or more or less faithful representations
of the Concept of Hegelian philosophy. This kind of inquiry, although supported by over 2400
years of tradition, remains governed by deep-seated metaphysical assumptions about the real
that Žižek demonstrates to be problematic, fantastic, and even illusory. The question,
therefore, must be articulated and situated otherwise. The question, then, is not simply "how
accurate are Žižek's readings of Hegel?" but "on the basis of what kind of reading do we deploy
and value this concept of accuracy?" and "how has this expectation already determined critical
procedures and outcomes?" Žižek, therefore, turns the initial question around and asks us to
reconsider the very ontological assumptions that already inform and shape our mode of
investigation. He would, in effect, respond to the question, "will the real Hegel please stand
up?" with another question—one which reverses the inquiry and asks about the expectations
and presumptions that already underlie and determine the question itself. Therefore, instead of
asking the somewhat naïve and direct question "will the real Hegel please stand up?" his inquiry
would be something like "why, how, and on the basis of what authority does a particular
articulation of Hegelian philosophy already present itself as and claim to be the real Hegel?"

Notes
1

Žižek's engagement with the work of Jacques Derrida, which is given its most sustained and

extended treatment in For They Know not What They Do (2008a), is complicated by the fact
that Žižek says little or nothing in response to Derrida's own writing but relies heavily on its
subsequent representation in Rodolphe Gasché's The Tain of the Mirror (1986). This
transaction mirrors the problem that motivates and is addressed by this essay. Namely, when it
comes to dealing with different representations of something, how are we to decide which one
is an accurate portrayal of the real thing and which ones are impostors? Clearly one way to
critique and to contest Žižek's reading of Derrida would be to show how Gasché's interpretation,
although not entirely wrong, is nevertheless not entirely consistent with Derrida as such. This
kind of demonstration, however, immediately falls back on and mobilize the very issue that is to
be addressed—the presumption of some pure and real original that is then distorted by
subsequent representation and proxy. Instead of mobilizing this common and often
unquestioned metaphysical assumption, the following endeavors to question its very structure,
procedure, and operation.
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2

For more on both To Tell the Truth and What's My Line, see what is arguably the definitive

resource for information regarding popular culture and related phenomena, Wikipedia
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/To_Tell_the_Truth). Although there is considerable debate
concerning the validity of data contained in this online, open source encyclopedia, it is
undoubtedly one of the best depositories of information on pop culture. Likewise various clips
of both game shows can be viewed at http://youtube.com. See, in particular,
http://youtube.com/ watch?v=p26yXdr4fLY for a 1966 version of To Tell the Truth and
http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=iXT2E9Ccc8A for Salvador Dali's appearance as a
contestant on What's My Line.
3

The characteristic distrust of sensation that is evident in Platonism is not Plato's innovation; it

is informed by and the product of a general attitude that was rather pervasive throughout
ancient Greece. "There was," as Debra Hawhee (2004) points out, "among the poets and
philosophers of ancient Greece a general distrust of sensation, for the eyes and ears as bodily
instruments were thought to be inherently deceptive, never reaching the truth, aletheia" (173).
4

In May of 1996, Alan Sokal, a physicist at NYU, published an article in the journal Social Text.

The article, "Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermenuetics of
Quantum Gravity" was composed as a deliberate parody of the prevailing "postmodernist
jargon" that had, in Sokal's estimations, taken root in some corners of the academy. "For some
years," Sokal wrote in a Lingua Franca article that sought to expose and explain his parody,
"I've been troubled by an apparent decline in the standards of rigor in certain precincts of the
academic humanities…So to test the prevailing intellectual standards, I decided to try a modest
(though admittedly uncontrolled) experiment: Would a leading North American journal of
cultural studies—whose editorial collective includes such luminaries as Fredric Jameson and
Andrew Ross—publish an article liberally salted with nonsense if (a) it sounded good and (b) it
flattered the editor's ideological preconceptions?" (Editors of Lingua Franca 2000: 49). Once
exhibited as such, the Sokal Hoax, as it came to be called, ignited a firestorm of commentary
and criticism that eventually landed on the front page of the New York Times.
5

In this way, Kantian philosophy anticipates a gesture that has become increasingly operative

in contemporary science. Serious practitioners of both the "hard" and social sciences often find
themselves asking and/or responding to what appears to be strange and somewhat surprising
questions, like the one to which Bruno Latour (1999) addresses himself at the beginning of
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Pandora's Hope: "Do you believe in reality?" (1). This question, which, if one believes Latour,
was articulated by a social scientist, manifests both the uneasy position of the real in
contemporary science and reveals the "faith-based initiatives" that some researchers have
found themselves employing in order to solidify and protect scientific knowledge. Despite the
fact that this question of "faith" is now often associated with the so-called "science wars," it is
actually much older and comprises one of the founding gestures of modern epistemology. In
the Meditations on First Philosophy (1988), for example, Descartes's search for a certain and
secure foundation for scientific thought leads him to doubt the veracity of everything that comes
to him through the mediation of the senses. In order to dispel this doubt and to secure access
to the real world outside the potentially solipsistic cogito ergo sum, he finds it necessary to posit
the existence of God, whose eternal goodness is such that He would not permit deception of
any kind. In Cartesian metaphysics, therefore, it is belief in a particular Christian understanding
of God that ensures both the existence of external reality and our access to it.
6

This Kantian insight, which for many years remained at the level of a philosophical argument,

was experimentally confirmed in the late 1950's and reported in a paper written by Humberto
Maturana, Jerry Lettvin, Warren McCulloch, and Walter Pitts. The paper, "What the Frog's Eye
Tells the Frog's Brain," describes an experiment where microelectrodes were implanted in the
visual cortex of a frog in order to measure the strength of neural responses to different visual
stimuli. "From the wired-up brain," N. Katherine Hayles (1999) explains, "the researchers
discovered that small objects in fast, erratic motion elicited maximum response, whereas large,
slow-moving objects evoked little or no response. It is easy to see how such perceptual
equipment is adaptive from the frog's point of view, because it allows the frog to perceive flies
while ignoring other phenomena irrelevant to its interests" (135). From this experimental data,
Maturana and his co-investigators, concluded that the frog's perceptual system does not so
much register reality as it is but constructs reality as it needs to be for the animal in question.
"What are the consequences of this work?" the authors ask at the end of the article.
"Fundamentally, it shows that the eye speaks to the brain in a language already highly
organized and interpreted instead of transmitting some more or less accurate copy of the
distribution of light upon the receptors" (Lettvin et al. 1965: 251). Like any good experimental
scientist, however, Maturana and company were careful to restrict their conclusions to the
particular animal upon which they operated. In fact, the article begins with an explicit caution
against generalizing the findings: "This work has been done on the frog, and our interpretation
applies only to the frog" (Lettvin et al. 1965: 230). Despite this reservation, the insights the
experiment offered were far too compelling to remain restricted to this one amphibian.
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Maturana, in particular, thought the work had wider application, and he eventually employed the
experiment as a spring board to revolutionize the simple empiricism that had governed
observational research. In subsequent publications, most notably the essays collected in
Autopoiesis and Cognition (1980), which was co-authored with Francisco Varela, Maturana
argued "that perception should not be viewed as a grasping of an external reality, but rather as
the specification of one" (xv) and, because of this, "no description of an absolute reality is
possible" (121). As Hayles (1999) summarizes it, "Maturana concluded that perception is not
fundamentally representational. He argued that to speak of an objectively existing world is
misleading, for the very idea of a world implies a realm that preexists its construction by an
observer. Certainly there is something 'out there,' which for lack of a better word we can call
'reality.' But it comes into existence for us, and for all living creatures, only through interactive
processes determined solely by the organism's own organization" (136). Maturana called this
new epistemology autopoiesis, because what is known about the world, although perhaps
triggered by something like an external event, is in fact "self-made" by the organism. According
to this innovative and radical theory of knowledge, an organism, whether it be an amphibian in a
laboratory or a primate observing that amphibian, never has immediate access to what is "really
real"—the thing itself—but only perceives the object that is constructed through the activity of its
own particular perceptual equipment.
7

This would not be the first time that Kant has become involved (fictionally, at least) with

American television game shows. His name and moral authority are also invoked in the Robert
Redford film Quiz Show (1994), which dramatizes the events surrounding the quiz show
scandal of the mid-1950s. At a crucial moment in the film's narrative, the protagonist, Charles
Van Dorn (Ralph Fiennes), is presented with a compelling but morally questionable opportunity
by the show's producers. They propose that Van Dorn be given the correct answers to the quiz
show questions in advance of the game in an attempt to better manipulate its presentation and
outcome. Van Dorn, who is visibly concerned about the ethical implications of such a proposal,
does not immediately respond. When asked the reason for his hesitation, he replies: "I was just
wondering what Kant would think of all this." To which one of the hopelessly uninformed
producers says, "I don't think he'd have a problem with it, do you?"
8

Elsewhere this oscillation between "presupposed" and "posited" is marked with the term

"(presup)posited" (Žižek 2008a: 209).

24

9

This is, of course, one of the animating fantasies behind a good deal of time travel narratives

from Jay Ward's cartoon Peabody's Improbably History (1959), in which Sherman, a young
child, and his bespectacled brainiac dog Peabody use the "wayback machine" to meet the great
figures of history, to Bill and Ted's Excellent Adventure (DEG 1989), in which two clueless
slackers travel backwards in time to meet the real Napoleon Bonaparte, Socrates, Beethoven,
and other historical figures in an attempt to complete their high school history project.
10

Stephen Colbert, the comedic political pundit of Comedy Central's Colbert Report, has

recently coined two words that address this development: "truthiness" and "wikiality."
Truthiness, which was named word of the year by the American Dialect Society in 2005 and
was incorporated into the Merriam-Webster Dictionary in 2006, was introduced during the
program's inaugural episode (Comedy Central, 17 October 2005). It designates, according to
Merriam-Webster, "the quality of preferring concepts or facts one wishes to be true, rather than
concepts or facts known to be true" (Merriam-Webster 2006: unpaginated). Wikiality was
introduced in episode 128 (31 July 2006) and is derived from the experience and features of the
online encyclopedia, Wikipedia. As Colbert explained, on Wikipedia "any user can change any
entry, and if enough users agree with them, it becomes true." Wikiality, then, is an agreed
upon reality that, although not necessarily real and true, becomes real and true simply through
user decision and agreement. These two concepts have come together in "Wikiality.com, the
Truthiness Encyclopedia." According to the site's welcome page, Wikiality.com is similar to
Wikipedia but "unlike Wikipedia, entries here are judged on their truthiness; if it feels right it's
probably truthy" (Wikiality.com 2008: unpaginated).
11

This "correspondence theory of truth" is evident in the scholastic definition of truth as

adaequatio intellectus et rei, the adequation of thought to things (Heidegger 1962: 257); René
Descartes's (1991) claim that "the word 'truth,' in the strict sense, denotes the conformity of
thought with its object" (139); and Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1965), which
grants, without any critical hesitation whatsoever (a somewhat ironic gesture in a text that is all
about "critique"), that truth is "the agreement of knowledge with its object" (A 58/B 82). In the
text of Being and Time, Heidegger (1962) traces this concept to an assertion that has been
attributed to Aristotle's De Interpretatione: "the soul's 'experiences,' its η
('representations'), are likenings of things" (257). Elsewhere, namely in the essay "Plato's
Doctrine of Truth," he demonstrates that the concept originates with Plato's "Allegory of the
Cave." It is in this imaginative fable, Heidegger (1978) argues, that one can perceive the point
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at which western thought began "taking the essence of truth as the correctness of
representation" (237).
12

One way to produce these kinds of "misreadings" is to engage in what Žižek calls, again

borrowing from Deleuze, "philosophical buggery." This practice comprises a kind of intellectual
promiscuity, whereby one takes an author from behind and gives him a child that would be his
own offspring, yet monstrous (Deleuze 1995: 6 and Žižek 2004: 46).
13

In fact, when push comes to shove, Žižek has sided with "totalitarian" and "fundamentalist"

positions against the seemingly excessive and unrestrained relativisms that currently proliferate
in the both the academy and contemporary politics. This decision can be seen in particular in
the concluding lines of his published response to Claudia Breger's (2001) critique: "What one
sees today is a kind of 'suspended' belief, a belief that can thrive only as not fully (publicly)
admitted, as a private obscene secret. This suspended status of our beliefs accounts for the
predominant 'antidogmatic' stance: one should modestly accept that all our positions are
relative, conditioned by contingent historical constellations, so that no one has definitive
Solutions, just pragmatic temporary solutions…Compare the struggle and pain of the
'fundamentalist' with the serene peace of the liberal democrat who, from a safe subjective
position, ironically dismisses every fully pledged engagement, every 'dogmatic' taking sides.
Consequently, yes, I plead guilty: in this choice, I without hesitation opt for the 'fundamentalist'"
(Žižek 2001b: 103).
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